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Assessing the Impact of the Ancillary 
Powers Doctrine on Three Decades  
of Charter Jurisprudence 
Vanessa MacDonnell* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has been said that one of the paradoxes of the entrenchment of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is that it has led to the 
expansion of police powers.1 While both Parliament and the courts have 
contributed to this expansion, Parliament’s involvement has been largely 
confined to the search and seizure context.2 Following a string of early 
post-Charter decisions in which the Supreme Court concluded that the 
police’s actions infringed the section 8 rights of the accused, Parliament 
amended the Criminal Code3 to amplify the search powers of police.4 
The courts, meanwhile, have used the ancillary powers doctrine to carve 
out expanded powers for the police. Thus, alongside Charter cases that 
delineate the rights of the accused and the limits of state power can be 
found cases in which the ancillary powers doctrine has been successfully 
                                                                                                             
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa (Common Law Section). 
Thank you to Leo Russomanno and Jula Hughes for helpful conversations about this paper, to the 
anonymous reviewers for their very useful comments, and to Julia Finniemore and Colin Heighton 
for their research assistance. Thank you also to members of the Faculty of Law, University of 
Ottawa (Common Law Section) for useful comments made in the context of a related paper that also 
greatly assisted in framing this piece. This paper builds upon James Stribopoulos’ considerable body 
of scholarship on common law police powers in Canada. 
1 See James Stribopoulos, “Has the Charter Been for Crime Control? Reflecting on 25 
Years of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in Canada” in Margaret E. Beare, ed., Honouring Social 
Justice: Honouring Dianne Martin (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) 351, at 359 
[hereinafter “Stribopoulos, ‘Crime Control’”]. Technically speaking, the powers of the police have 
not actually been expanded, since the idea is that the power existed all along but had simply not been 
articulated until that moment. Following Stribopoulos, however, I will refer to the ancillary powers 
cases as creating “new” police powers. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter 
“Charter”]. 
2 James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the 
Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1 [hereinafter “Stribopoulos, ‘In Search of Dialogue’”]. 
3 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
4 Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 2, at 64-67. 
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invoked to uphold the actions of police against claims of unauthorized 
police conduct.5 In the latter cases, the courts have dismissed the ac-
cused’s Charter claim after recognizing a new common law police power 
authorizing the officer’s actions ex post. 
James Stribopoulos has been critical of the role that courts have 
played in the expansion of police powers since 1982.6 In his view, 
judicial elaboration of police powers is a departure from the Supreme 
Court’s “historic role of standing firm between the individual and the 
state, and refusing to make up for shortcomings in police powers”.7 
Stribopoulos argues that it is simply not the Court’s role in adjudicating 
cases under the Charter to ensure that the police are equipped with the 
powers they need to investigate crime. He suggests that Parliament is 
better suited to the task of balancing the “competing goals and purposes” 
inherent in defining the scope of the police’s authority, particularly since 
those powers have an impact upon individual rights.8 
In this paper I explore the factors that may have led the Supreme 
Court to assume a role in articulating new police powers since 1982. I 
also attempt to situate the ancillary powers cases within the context of a 
larger jurisprudential trend of balancing individual rights and “societal 
interests”9 outside of section 1 that has emerged in the Charter case law.10 
I will suggest that courts may be disposed to create new common law 
police powers because in some cases, the police have infringed the 
Charter rights of a suspect in a manner that the court concludes is 
reasonable or justifiable, but the constitutional machinery upon which it 
normally relies to give effect to such arguments — that is, section 1 — is 
functionally unavailable.11 Since the police are not typically authorized 
to violate Charter rights in carrying out their duties, their actions will 
rarely satisfy section 1’s prescribed by law requirement.12 Precluded 
from justifying the rights violation under section 1, the only remaining 
question is whether any evidence gathered should be excluded pursuant 
                                                                                                             
5 Id. 
6 Id., at 54-55. 
7 Id., at 55. 
8 Id., at 55-56. 
9 The term “societal interests” has been used throughout the Supreme Court case law. For 
an example in the police powers context, see, e.g., R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 
59, at para. 15 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mann”]. I will use this term throughout. 
10 See Vanessa MacDonnell, “Interrogating the Supreme Court’s decision in R v Sinclair” 
38 Queen’s L.J. (forthcoming in 2012) [hereinafter “MacDonnell, ‘Sinclair’”]. 
11 Id. 
12 Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 
2010), at 27 [hereinafter “Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law”]. 
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to section 24(2) of the Charter. In practice, this means that the court is 
unable to consider arguments that go to justification, such as the argu-
ment that society has an “interest in effective policing”13 or that the 
conduct is otherwise proportional, unless the court identifies a common 
law source of authority for the police’s actions and/or considers such 
arguments at some other stage of the analysis. 
Both the jurisprudence and the academic commentary suggest that 
the way that courts conceive of and approach their role in Charter cases 
is influenced significantly by the “two-stage”, infringement-justification 
structure of Charter analysis.14 The presence of section 1 means that 
courts are free to interpret rights robustly at the first stage of the analy-
sis;15 it is only if a Charter violation is established that the court moves 
on to consider whether the limitation on Charter rights can be justified.16 
The two-stage mode of analysis thus preserves the integrity of the 
Charter’s individual rights guarantees while also making it possible for 
the government to limit those rights in cases where it can proffer suffi-
cient justification.17 
It is of more than trifling significance, then, that the two-stage mode 
of Charter analysis is not a feature of most criminal procedure cases.18 As 
I have noted, the section 1 inquiry is greatly truncated in most legal 
rights cases because of the impossibility of satisfying the prescribed by 
law requirement. For this reason, it is not surprising that courts have 
searched for ways of giving effect to justification-type arguments outside 
of section 1. In this paper I argue that, whether intentionally or not, the 
functional unavailability of section 1 in police powers cases has led the 
courts to elaborate a doctrine of ancillary powers that is virtually indis-
tinguishable from the justification analysis prescribed in R. v. Oakes.19 
                                                                                                             
13 Mann, supra, note 9, at para. 15. I will use this language throughout. 
14 See R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”]; 
Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the Charter” (1988) 
10 S.C.L.R. 469, at 472 [hereinafter “Weinrib, ‘Section One’”]. I will use this terminology 
throughout. 
15 See R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.). 
16 Notable exceptions include the jurisprudence under ss. 7 and 10(b) and 11(b) of the Char-
ter: see MacDonnell, “Sinclair”, supra, note 10. 
17 R. v. Swain, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, at 977 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Swain”]. 
18 There are two circumstances where this is not the case. The first is where Parliament or a 
provincial legislature has enacted a statutory framework to govern the police’s exercise of authority. 
There are few such examples outside the s. 8 context, where Parliament has created a statutory 
scheme to govern search and seizure. The second involves the ancillary powers cases, which I 
discuss in this paper. 
19 Supra, note 14. 
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Rather than concluding that the police’s unauthorized conduct violated 
the accused’s Charter rights but that the infringement is justified under 
section 1 (something the Court is unable to do for the reasons identified 
above), the Court instead concludes that the police’s actions can be 
justified under the ancillary powers doctrine. By curing the deficiency 
which previously raised a credible Charter issue — that is, the lack of 
authority to detain or search — the Charter analysis is effectively pre-
empted.20 At the very least, the section 1 justification mechanism becomes 
available, the prescribed by law issue having been resolved by recogniz-
ing a new source of police power grounded in the common law.21 
I begin this paper by attempting to substantiate the claim that the 
functional unavailability of the section 1 analysis in most police powers 
cases has led the Supreme Court to develop a doctrine of ancillary 
powers that mirrors the Oakes test. I then discuss the concerns that arise 
from this “end run”22 around the Charter. The first is that the ancillary 
powers doctrine precludes the courts from engaging in an assessment of 
the Charter compliance of police conduct that may give rise to a credible 
Charter claim. Instead, the focus of the analysis is on whether a new 
police power should be recognized. While the courts do not ignore the 
Charter in the context of this inquiry, its role is nonetheless diminished, 
resulting in a legal analysis that underemphasizes the constitutional 
status of the accused’s legal rights.23 Second, the ancillary powers 
doctrine empowers courts to mete out additional law enforcement 
powers, a function that is more legislative than judicial.24 The better 
approach, as Stribopoulos suggests, is to leave the expansion of police 
powers to Parliament.25 I conclude by briefly discussing possible 
criticisms that might be raised in response to the theory outlined in this 
paper and by addressing the relevance of section 24(2) to my analysis. 
                                                                                                             
20 R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725, at para. 79 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Clayton”], per Binnie J. 
21 If a common law police power has been recognized but the police exceed that power, the 
deprivation of rights is similarly not prescribed by law. 
22 Clayton, supra, note 20, at para. 79. I will use this term throughout. 
23 Id., at para. 78, per Binnie J. 
24 Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 2. 
25 Id.; James Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment? Investigative Detention: Ten Years Later” 
(2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 335, at 380-81, 390-92. 
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II. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE ANCILLARY  
POWERS TEST AND R. V. OAKES 
In the past three decades, the Supreme Court of Canada has devel-
oped a doctrine of ancillary powers that is virtually indistinguishable 
from the justification analysis prescribed by Oakes. The strongest 
support for this claim can be found in the ancillary powers cases them-
selves. Beginning in the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Dedman26 and 
continuing through Cloutier v. Langlois,27 R. v. Mann,28 R. v. Clayton,29 
R. v. M. (A.)30 and R. v. Kang-Brown,31 the Supreme Court “refined and 
incrementally applied the Waterfield [ancillary powers] test”32 until it 
closely resembled the Oakes test in both form and function. 
Dedman was the first ancillary powers case to be heard by the Su-
preme Court. There, a majority of the Court adopted the common law 
police powers test established by the British Court of Appeals two 
decades earlier in R. v. Waterfield, that is, “whether (a) such conduct falls 
within the general scope of any duty imposed by statute or recognised at 
common law and (b) whether such conduct, albeit within the general 
scope of such a duty, involved an unjustifiable use of powers associated 
with the duty.”33 As under section 1, the focus of the Waterfield test was 
on whether the exercise of police power was justified in the circum-
stances. Although the inquiry into justification did not take place against 
the backdrop of an infringement of constitutional rights (Waterfield was 
not a Charter case), it was clear that whatever powers were conferred on 
the police subtracted from the liberty of individual citizens.34 This gave 
rise to a requirement of justification. 
Justice Le Dain, writing for the majority, qualified the nature of the 
liberty at stake in Dedman. He noted that 
                                                                                                             
26 [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dedman”]. 
27 [1990] S.C.J. No. 10, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.). 
28 Supra, note 9. 
29 Supra, note 20. 
30 [2008] S.C.J. No. 19, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “M. (A.)”]. 
31 [2008] S.C.J. No. 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kang-Brown”]. 
32 Mann, supra, note 9, at para. 25. 
33 R. v. Waterfield; R. v. Lynn, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, at 661 (C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Water-
field”], cited in Dedman, supra, note 26, at para. 20. 
34 See Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 2, at 8, citing T.R.S. Allan, “Con-
stitutional Rights and Common Law” (1991) 11 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 453, at 457. See generally 
Kent Roach, “Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court and 
Canadian Legislatures” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 481. 
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In applying the Waterfield test to the random stop of a motor vehicle 
for the purpose contemplated by the R.I.D.E. program, it is convenient 
to refer to the right to circulate in a motor vehicle on the public 
highway as a “liberty” ... In assessing the interference with this right by 
a random vehicle stop, one must bear in mind, however, that the right is 
not a fundamental liberty like the ordinary right of movement of the 
individual, but a licensed activity that is subject to regulation and 
control for the protection of life and property.35 
In the cases that followed Dedman, the individual liberty interest at stake 
was often significantly weightier. In R. v. Golden,36 for example, the 
Court was asked to decide whether the common law authorized the 
police to perform a strip search of a suspect incident to arrest. Even 
where this lesser liberty interest was concerned, however, the Court in 
Dedman concluded that the exercise of police powers must be both 
necessary and reasonable to survive the justification inquiry.37 The 
R.I.D.E. program challenged in Dedman met these requirements because 
it was necessary to ensure the safety of other motorists and reasonable 
“having regard to the nature of the liberty interfered with and the impor-
tance of the public purpose served by the interference”.38 One can see in 
this analysis traces of the Oakes test, including requirements of a pressing 
and substantial objective, minimal impairment and proportionality. 
In the subsequent case of Cloutier v. Langois,39 the Supreme Court 
was asked to determine whether the police had a common law power to 
search a suspect incident to arrest. Cloutier v. Langois is revealing 
because here the full extent of the similarity between the ancillary 
powers doctrine and Oakes emerges. The Court explained that the 
common law authorized the police to search a suspect incident to arrest 
where the search “m[et] the underlying objectives” of the common law 
power, was conducted “for a valid objective in pursuit of the ends of 
criminal justice, such as the discovery of an object that may be a threat to 
the safety of the police, the accused or the public, or that may facilitate 
escape or act as evidence against the accused”, and was not performed 
“in an abusive fashion”.40 The “frisk” at issue in Cloutier v. Langois fell 
within these parameters, the Court explained, because “a brief search 
                                                                                                             
35 Dedman, supra, note 26, at para. 68. 
36 [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Golden”]. 
37 Dedman, supra, note 26, at para. 69. 
38 Id. 
39 Supra, note 27. 
40 Id., at 187 S.C.R., paras. 61, 62. See also Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal 
Law, supra, note 12, at 252. 
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does not constitute, in view of the objectives sought, a disproportionate 
interference with the freedom of persons lawfully arrested,” nor were 
there “less intrusive means of attaining these objectives”.41 
The parallels between this analysis and Oakes are obvious. The 
Court began by identifying a rights infringement (in common law terms, 
a deprivation of “liberty”42) caused by the exercise of police power. It 
then asked whether the infringement furthered a pressing and substantive 
objective (the “effective control of criminal acts”43 by police), whether 
there was a rational connection between the exercise of the power and 
the objective sought to be achieved (“necessary in order for the peace 
officers to perform their duty”44), whether the measure was minimally 
impairing (are there “less intrusive means of attaining these objec-
tives”?45) and proportional (“reasonable in light of the public purposes 
served ... on the one hand and on the other respect for the liberty and 
fundamental dignity of individuals”46). 
The stages of the Waterfield test thus mirror the Oakes analysis with 
startling precision. The Court’s broader framing of the ancillary powers 
doctrine also mimics the section 1 inquiry, insofar as the Court has 
acknowledged that police powers cases permit the courts to “balance” 
society’s interest in effective law enforcement and individual rights. In 
Mann, for example, the majority’s reasons for judgment began by noting 
that the appeal “offer[ed] another opportunity to consider the delicate 
balance that must be struck in adequately protecting individual liberties 
and properly recognizing legitimate police functions.”47 
In the more recent police powers cases, some members of the Court 
have acknowledged the functional similarity between the ancillary 
powers doctrine and section 1. The justices who have drawn this link are 
critical of the expansion of police powers that has occurred under the 
doctrine. In Clayton, for example, the majority applied the ancillary 
powers doctrine to conclude that the police were justified in setting up a 
roadblock at the exits of a strip club after receiving a call that several 
males were brandishing handguns in the parking lot of the club. The 
majority noted that the police had reasonable grounds to detain vehicles 
                                                                                                             
41 Cloutier v. Langlois, supra, note 27, at 186 S.C.R., para. 58. 
42 Id., at 183. See also Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 2, at 2. 
43 Cloutier v. Langois, supra, note 27, at 181 S.C.R., para. 50. 
44 Id. 
45 Id., at 186 S.C.R., para. 58. 
46 Id., at 181-82 S.C.R., para. 50. 
47 Mann, supra, note 9, at para. 1. 
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as they were leaving the parking lot because the alleged offence was 
grave and posed a threat to the broader public, and the scope of the 
roadblock was limited in its duration and geographic scope.48 The 
majority also found that the subsequent search incident to investigative 
detention was justified in the circumstances. 
In concurring reasons, Binnie J., writing for three members of the 
Court, chastised the majority for doing an “end run” around the Charter.49 
He argued that the Waterfield test and section 1 were not and should not 
be “duplicative of one another”.50 Crafting a common law test for police 
powers that rendered the Charter analysis redundant moved the analysis 
out of the constitutional framework and into the much more discretionary 
realm of the common law. There, Binnie J. pointed out, the Charter rights 
of the accused had no logical priority over other interests.51 The majority 
responded that the ancillary powers doctrine did not effect an “end run”52 
around the Charter because “Charter values” informed the articulation of 
the police’s common law powers.53 
I will address the substance of the criticisms raised by the concurring 
justices in Clayton in the following section. For the moment, it is 
sufficient to note that while the justices seem divided on the question of 
whether the similarities between the Oakes test and the ancillary powers 
doctrine are problematic, the existence of these similarities is not lost on 
the Court. Not only do these similarities emerge through a careful 
parsing of the cases, therefore, but they have also been acknowledged by 
the Court in the more recent ancillary powers cases. 
III. THE CHARTER AS INTERPRETATIVE TOOL  
AND OTHER CONCERNS 
Against the backdrop of the functional unavailability of section 1 in 
police powers cases, the Court appears to have reconstructed the Oakes 
analysis at the stage of determining whether the police were authorized 
                                                                                                             
48 Clayton, supra, note 20, at paras. 33-41. 
49 Id., at para. 79, per Binnie J. 
50 Id., at para. 78, per Binnie J. 
51 Id. For a related critique made in the context of the Supreme Court’s “Charter values” 
jurisprudence, see J.A. Manwaring, “Bringing the Common Law to the Bar of Justice: A Comment 
on the Decision in the Case of Dolphin Delivery Ltd.” (1987) 19 Ottawa L. Rev. 413. 
52 Id., at para. 79, per Binnie J. 
53 Id., at para. 21. 
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by the common law to detain and/or search the accused. In this section I 
canvass concerns that are raised by this approach. 
The first concern is that the ancillary powers doctrine effects an “end 
run” around the Charter.54 To take just one example, recognition of a 
power to search incident to arrest in Cloutier v. Langois has significantly 
altered the dynamic involved in challenging such searches under the 
Charter. In cases involving a search incident to arrest, the inquiry now 
begins by asking whether the police had a common law power to search 
incident to arrest. If they did not, a section 8 violation is automatically 
established. If the police were authorized by the common law to conduct 
the search, then two of the three requirements for finding a search 
“reasonable” within the meaning of section 8 are satisfied, in that the 
search is authorized by the common law and reasonableness of common 
law rule will have been established by the Waterfield test.55 In theory, the 
section 8 inquiry then shifts to the manner in which the search was 
conducted. If the search incident to arrest was carried out in a reasonable 
manner, then there is no violation of section 8.56 But the context-specific 
nature of the Waterfield test is such that this third question is also bound 
up in the determination of whether the police were authorized to act as 
they did. In other words, the question for the Court under the ancillary 
powers doctrine is “did the police, in the circumstances of this case, act 
within the scope of the authority conferred on them by the common 
law?” If the answer is yes, then it seems as though all three of the 
requirements for a reasonable search have been satisfied. The majority 
appears to confirm this in Clayton when it stated, in relation to Charter 
challenges under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, that “[if] the police 
conduct in detaining and searching Clayton and Farmer amounted to a 
lawful exercise of their common law powers, there was no violation of 
their Charter rights.”57 In a very real sense, then, the Waterfield test is 
                                                                                                             
54 Id., at para. 79, per Binnie J. 
55 Section 8 of the Charter provides that “everyone has the right to be free from unreason-
able search and seizure.” As the Court in Mann explained, citing the Supreme Court’s earlier 
decision in R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Collins”], 
“[u]nder Collins, warrantless searches are deemed reasonable if (a) they are authorized by law, (b) 
the law itself is reasonable, and (c) the manner in which the search was carried out was also 
reasonable”: Mann, supra, note 9, at para. 36. By recognizing a power to search incident to arrest, 
the Supreme Court effectively neutralizes the first two of these requirements. Note, however, that a 
majority of the Court in Golden, supra, note 36, did consider whether the common law rule 
authorizing the police to conduct strip searches incident to arrest for limited purposes was 
unreasonable. 
56 Collins, id. 
57 Clayton, supra, note 20, at para. 19. See also paras. 43-44, 49. 
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serving in at least some cases as a substitute for both stages of the 
Charter analysis.58 
On some level, this is desirable. If it were possible to succeed on a 
constitutional challenge to a common law police power, it would mean 
that the court had promulgated an unconstitutional common law rule, 
something that seems to be particularly problematic.59 As LeBel J. stated 
in Kang-Brown: 
The common law has long been viewed as a law of liberty. Should we 
move away from that tradition, which is still part of the ethos of our 
legal system and of our democracy? This case is about the freedom of 
individuals and the proper function of the courts as guardians of the 
Constitution. I doubt that it should lead us to depart from the common 
law tradition of freedom by changing the common law itself to restrict 
the freedoms protected by the Constitution under s. 8 of the Charter.60 
Yet this is exactly what LeBel J., concurring in the reasons of Binnie J. in 
Clayton, suggested just a year before penning his judgment in Kang-
Brown.61 After noting that the Constitution, and not the common law, 
should be employed to decide the issue before the Court, the three 
concurring justices in Clayton proceeded to carve out a common law 
police power that they acknowledged was in violation of section 9 of the 
Charter.62 The justices then went on to find that the rights violation could 
be saved under section 1. A constitutionally compliant common law rule 
in hand, Binnie J. then assessed whether the police acted within the scope 
of their common law powers in conducting the roadblock, and, finding 
that they did, would have allowed the appeal.63 
                                                                                                             
58 See also Mann, supra, note 9. 
59 As a general rule, the Supreme Court has taken the position that if the constitutional 
infirmity can be cured through an incremental change to the common law, the courts will adapt the 
rule accordingly. If, on the other hand, the changes required to bring the common law into 
compliance with the Charter are of such a degree that they could only be accomplished by departing 
significantly from the common law mode of incremental development, then the Court must go on to 
decide whether the rule should be “saved” under s. 1: see R. v. Salituro, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97, [1991] 
3 S.C.R. 654 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Salituro”]; Swain, supra, note 17. While I have difficulties with 
this approach, I would note that the considerations are quite different when a new common law rule 
is being created. In those circumstances, I would suggest, it is inappropriate for the courts to craft a 
new common law rule that is not Charter-compliant. 
60 Supra, note 31, at para. 12. 
61 See Clayton, supra, note 20, at paras. 58-59. 
62 In so doing, Binnie J. noted that this was not unprecedented: see Clayton, id., at para. 
105, citing Swain, supra, note 17; R. v. Daviault, [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.); 
British Columbia Government Employees’ Union v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1988] 
S.C.J. No. 76, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 (S.C.C.). 
63 Clayton, id., at para. 121. 
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While the nature of common law reasoning might place certain limits 
on the Court’s ability to bring existing common law into compliance with 
the Charter,64 it is very difficult to see how it could ever be justifiable to 
craft new common law rules that are inconsistent with the Charter. 
Moreover, creating a common law rule that requires justification under 
section 1 inevitably requires the courts to do what the government would 
otherwise be required to do — that is, to demonstrate that the interests 
served by the newly created common law rule are sufficiently important 
to warrant overriding constitutional rights.65 This task places courts in a 
very awkward position.66 Thus, whatever the problems raised by the 
Court’s ancillary powers jurisprudence, the answer does not lie in the 
hybrid approach adopted by the concurring Justices in Clayton.67 Rather, 
the most principled course of action is for the courts to analyze these 
cases relying solely on the framework provided by the Charter. 
So what is the precise nature of the problem created by the “end run” 
in these cases? After all, we know that the ancillary powers doctrine 
builds in an analogous degree of protection for the individual’s common 
law liberty interests and for “Charter values” as section 1. This suggests 
that the ancillary powers test developed by the Court protects, or is at 
least sensitive to, individual rights. The problem, in brief, is that in these 
cases, which typically raise a credible Charter issue, the Charter is 
nowhere to be found, other than lurking as a system of values to which 
courts might or ought to have resort in resolving the question of the 
extent of the police’s powers. In other words, the problem is that the 
Court’s mode of analysis engages the Charter in a manner that seems 
inconsistent with its status as supreme law.68 One of the main features of 
the Charter’s two-stage mode of analysis is that individual rights are the 
focal point of the inquiry. Even at the section 1 stage, where the Court is 
asked to inquire into whether a deprivation of rights can be justified, the 
analysis is oriented so as to recognize the primacy of individual rights.69 
Chief Justice Dickson explained the dual character of section 1 in Oakes 
as follows: 
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It is important to observe ... that s. 1 has two functions: first, it 
constitutionally guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in the 
provisions which follow; and, second, it states explicitly the exclusive 
justificatory criteria (outside of s. 33 of the Constitution Act, 1982) 
against which limitations on those rights and freedoms must be 
measured. Accordingly, any s. 1 inquiry must be premised on an 
understanding that the impugned limit violates constitutional rights and 
freedoms — rights and freedoms which are part of the supreme law of 
Canada. As Wilson J. stated in Singh v. Minister of Employment and 
Immigration, supra, at p. 218: “... it is important to remember that the 
courts are conducting this inquiry in light of a commitment to uphold 
the rights and freedoms set out in the other sections of the Charter.”70 
Yet this rights orientation is conspicuously absent when the police 
powers inquiry takes place at the level of the common law. There, the 
focus is not on individual rights but on the extent of the police’s powers. 
In some sense, then, the ancillary powers doctrine, though incorporating 
a form of proportionality analysis, has the inverse of a rights orientation. 
Rather than being anchored in a theory of rights as limits on police 
powers, the ancillary powers doctrine is anchored in a theory of police 
powers as limits on rights. 
A related problem that arises from the Supreme Court’s approach in 
the ancillary powers cases is that it downgrades the Charter from 
constitutional document to mere interpretative tool. In Clayton, the 
majority responded to the criticisms of the concurring justices by 
explaining that the Charter was not irrelevant to the analysis in ancillary 
powers cases. Rather, Charter “values” informed the inquiry into whether 
the common law authorized the police to act in the manner they did. The 
ancillary powers doctrine, the majority explained: 
... is consistent with Charter values because it requires the state to 
justify the interference with liberty based on criteria which focus on 
whether the interference with liberty is necessary given the extent of 
the risk and the liberty at stake, and no more intrusive to liberty than 
reasonably necessary to address the risk.71 
In other words, the majority seemed to be of the view that the require-
ments of reasonableness and necessity adequately safeguarded the 
Charter “interests” of the accused. On some level, of course, they are 
correct. The fact that the ancillary powers test essentially replicates the 
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analysis under section 1 means that sufficient justification must be 
provided to support the expansion of police powers.72 But in characteriz-
ing the accused’s rights as Charter “values”, the Court treats the Charter 
as a mere interpretative tool in a case involving the unauthorized exercise 
of power by a state actor. 
A third concern raised by the Supreme Court’s ancillary powers ju-
risprudence is “institutional”.73 As Stribopoulos explains, the courts have 
typically been regarded as defenders of rights rather than amplifiers of 
police powers.74 The ancillary powers cases thus raise the question of 
whether courts are qualified to carve out new police powers and, assum-
ing they are qualified, whether it is appropriate for them to do so.75 
Stribopoulos suggests that courts are not suited to this task for several 
reasons. When the courts take the lead in expanding police powers, he 
argues, lacunae in police powers “[are] unlikely to make [their] way onto 
Parliament’s agenda”76 and a potentially productive “dialogue” between 
Parliament and the courts about the appropriate scope of police powers in 
a constitutional state is precluded.77 This approach also leaves police 
powers to be developed on a case-by-case basis rather than in a whole-
sale manner by the political branch of government.78 Stribopoulos also 
suggests that when courts give new powers to the police, they are overly 
optimistic about the degree to which the police will understand the limits 
of those powers and deploy them appropriately.79 This is especially 
problematic given that police powers carved out by the courts are usually 
“open-ended” and therefore susceptible to misuse.80 
When Parliament chooses to legislate new police powers, they must 
be prepared to advance sufficient justification for any rights infringe-
ments that result. When the courts ground new police powers in the 
common law, they must supply this justification. In recognizing addi-
tional common law police powers, therefore, the courts become partners 
in rights limitation.81 This is simply not a position that courts ought to 
take, or can take credibly. 
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IV. THE CRITICS AND THE ROLE OF SECTION 24(2) 
Before concluding, I will respond very briefly to the primary critique 
that might be raised in response to the theory I have advanced here. It 
might be said that the argument I make in this paper wrongly assumes 
that courts ought never to seek to give effect to societal interests, such as 
the interest in effective policing that drives the creation of new police 
powers, outside of the strict framework of the section 1 analysis. Indeed, 
there are many examples of Charter cases in which the courts have given 
effect to societal interests at the stage of defining the content of the right 
at issue.82 However, this approach has proven controversial.83 The most 
coherent accounts of the two-stage mode of Charter analysis insist upon 
a conceptual distinction between the two stages.84 As Lamer C.J.C. stated 
in his majority reasons in Swain, the concern with considering societal 
interests at the first stage of the Charter analysis is that it undermines the 
Charter guarantees of the accused.85 In my opinion, this view extends to 
the development of new police powers under the ancillary powers 
doctrine. I would also suggest that doctrinal clarity and coherent consti-
tutional method requires that societal interests be reserved for the section 
1 stage of Charter analysis. When these arguments surface elsewhere, the 
integrity of Charter analysis tends to be compromised. 
A final word about the role of section 24(2) of the Charter in this 
analysis. I have referred throughout this paper to the “two-stage” model 
of Charter analysis. In many criminal procedure cases, of course, there is 
a “third” stage. If the court concludes that the state has unjustifiably 
limited the Charter rights of the accused, the court moves on to the 
question of remedy and specifically, to the question of whether any 
evidence gathered in breach of the Charter should be excluded. One of 
the practical effects of the ancillary powers doctrine is that courts simply 
never reach the stage where the exclusion of evidence is considered, 
since the recognition of a new police power almost always presages the 
failure of the accused’s Charter claim. Thus, section 24(2) simply does 
not play a meaningful role in this analysis in police powers cases. It 
should also be noted that section 24(2) cannot serve as a meaningful 
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substitute for section 1 in cases where the section 1 analysis is function-
ally unavailable because section 1 and section 24(2) serve different 
functions. The concerns that animate the section 1 inquiry are primarily 
related to the costs associated with limiting Charter rights in a particular 
case. The section 24(2) analysis, on the other hand, is concerned with the 
“long-term repute of the justice system”.86 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have argued that in ancillary powers cases, the Su-
preme Court appears to have relocated the section 1 justification analysis 
to the stage of determining whether the police were acting within the 
scope of their common law police powers when they detained and/or 
arrested an accused. I have suggested that one possible explanation for 
this state of affairs is the functional unavailability of the section 1 
analysis in cases where the police have violated Charter rights without 
prior legislative or common law authorization. 
It is clear that the ancillary doctrine incorporates a similar require-
ment of justification as section 1, meaning that police powers will be 
crafted in a manner that satisfies a standard of proportionality. But this 
departure from the standard mode of Charter analysis still raises con-
cerns, for the reasons I have explained in this paper. There are many 
reasons why courts ought not to be engaged in the incremental expansion 
of police powers, the principal one being that it casts courts in the role of 
facilitating the progressive erosion of Charter rights.87 Rights are far 
weightier than the common law interpretative tools that courts have 
imagined them to be in the police powers context. This fact has been 
obscured by the ancillary powers doctrine that has developed in Canada 
since Dedman. When Charter rights are but one among many competing 
interests to consider in fashioning common law rules, the evidence 
suggests that individual rights are sacrificed. For all these reasons, then, 
courts should be reluctant to continue expanding police powers under the 
ancillary powers doctrine. 
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